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In this paper we suggest that differing approaches to the science of social cognition
mirror the arguments between radical embodied and traditional approaches to cognition.
We contrast the use in social cognition of theoretical inference and mental simulation
mechanisms with approaches emphasizing a direct perception of others’ mental states.
We build from a recent integrative framework unifying these divergent perspectives
through the use of dual-process theory and supporting social neuroscience research.
Our elaboration considers two complementary notions of direct perception: one primarily
stemming from ecological psychology and the other from enactive cognition theory. We
use this as the foundation from which to offer an account of the informational basis for
social information and assert a set of research propositions to further the science of
social cognition. In doing so, we point out how perception of the minds of others can
be supported in some cases by lawful information, supporting direct perception of social
affordances and perhaps, mental states, and in other cases by cues that support indirect
perceptual inference. Our goal is to extend accounts of social cognition by integrating
advances across disciplines to provide a multi-level and multi-theoretic description that
can advance this field and offer a means through which to reconcile radical embodied and
traditional approaches to cognitive neuroscience.
Keywords: social cognition, direct perception, social affordances, embodied neuroscience
INTRODUCTION
Although the embodied approach to cognition has made great
strides shifting the consensus of how perception, action, and cog-
nition are viewed across a number of disciplines, the role of men-
tal representations in such processes is still highly debated (e.g.,
Chemero, 2009; Wilson and Golonka, 2013). Such divergence in
perspectives may suggest that embodied cognitive neuroscience
requires an integrative account that allows room for both repre-
sentational and non-representational perspectives (cf. Dale, 2010;
Horton et al., 2012). A key point of contention between these
perspectives centers on whether or not perception can be direct or
must necessarily be indirect (cf. Ullman, 1980). Similar arguments
have been made in the field of social cognition (see Barrett et al.,
2007; Bohl and van den Bos, 2012). In particular, this field is
typically united through its focus on the perceptions, actions, and
cognitive processes involved during observations and interactions
between conspecifics (Frith and Frith, 2007); however, because of
the large number of disciplines and perspectives involved (e.g.,
social and cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy),
the mechanisms underlying social cognitive processes remain
highly debated.
The specific debate often centers on the ways in which humans
are able to understand the mental states of others, whether
through inferential mechanisms (e.g., Gopnik and Wellman,
1992), simulation mechanisms (e.g., Blakemore and Decety,
2001; Goldman, 2006), and/or direct perception (Gallagher, 2008;
De Jaegher, 2009). This is the core of the present article: to
provide an integrated theoretical account of social cognitive
mechanisms, with a specific focus on the role of direct per-
ception. Recent integrative accounts suggest that humans have
the capability to employ each of these mechanisms, though,
in differing contexts (e.g., Beer and Ochsner, 2006; Bohl and
van den Bos, 2012). This has been argued through theoriz-
ing that relies on findings from social cognitive neuroscience
(Bohl and van den Bos, 2012), by incorporating the findings
of two generally distinct types of cognitive processes useful for
characterizing social cognition (Satpute and Lieberman, 2006;
Lieberman, 2007; Adolphs, 2009). We suggest that this account
of social cognition is limited in the extent to which it fully
elaborates on the prospects for and limitations of direct social
perception.
To address this limitation, we draw from a complemen-
tary set of theories that have not yet been fully integrated.
As such, our aim is to extend accounts of social cognition
by leveraging advances across disciplines to provide a multi-
level and multi-theoretic description of social cognition that can
also be informative to the integration of conflicting views in
embodied cognitive neuroscience. This will, necessarily, mean
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that the following paper will cover theoretical breadth rather
than depth as we acknowledge that multiple approaches are
needed in order to attempt a more holistic understanding of
social cognition. Table 1 provides an overview of the scope
of the theoretical approaches addressed in this manuscript in
accord with Repko’s (2008) guidelines for theoretical integra-
tion. Specifically, Table 1 is included here to detail the major
theories that contribute to the overarching framework, key
assumptions from each viewpoint, level of the framework where
each theory provides insights, and the associated underpinning
mechanisms of social cognition. Each of these is elaborated
on throughout in more detail. We assert that the integration
of these perspectives will ultimately lead researchers to con-
sider a more holistic approach to the science of social cog-
nition and further the contributions of the radical embodied
approach.
First, we provide an overview of the various disciplinary
approaches to social cognition and then detail how these have
been recently integrated into a coherent framework. We then
express some of the limitations of that framework and describe
how to address these. Namely, we argue that the perceptual
basis for social cognition requires more attention with regard to
prospects for what kind of social information can and cannot be
directly perceived. Second, we define two complementary notions
of direct perception: the embodied and embedded view of direct
perception, which often focuses on social affordances (McArthur
and Baron, 1983; Zebrowitz and Collins, 1997; Baron, 2007) and
the enactive view of direct perception that argues for cases where
mental states may be perceived directly (Gallagher, 2008; De
Jaegher, 2009; Di Paolo and De Jaegher, 2012; Gangopadhyay and
Schilbach, 2012). Third, we then elaborate on the informational
basis for social perception by detailing the kinematic specification
of dynamics (KSD) principle, a framework of social cues and
social signals, situation semantics, the distinction between pro-
jectable and non-projectable properties, and the potential neural
basis for direct social perception. Lastly, we attempt to integrate
frameworks of direct and inferential perception from ecological
psychology into the context of social perception and under-
standing of social interaction dynamics. We suggest that effective
processing of social information is foundational to successfully
interacting with others. We do not delve deeply into the variety
of purposes of social cognition, writ large, such as managing
relationships (e.g., Fiske, 1992; Beckes et al., 2014; Bohl, 2014),
rather, we suggest that even basic and short-term interactions are
contingent on the utilization of social information. Our goal is,
not only to provide a more detailed articulation of some of the
foundational mechanisms for social cognition, but also to advance
a research agenda useful for integrating the radical embodied and
traditional representational view of cognition. We next review
long-standing and more recent accounts of social cognition.
DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL COGNITION
Since social cognition emerged as a theoretical and empiri-
cal area of research, the prevailing views incorporated tradi-
tional information processing perspectives on cognition. These
approaches considered the brain as the mechanism through
which complex mental representations of the social environment
served the adaptive needs of an individual. Emerging from
dominant views within computational and information pro-
cessing theories of cognition, such approaches focused on the
role and functions of the central nervous system when deal-
ing with the social environment. Developmental, cognitive,
and neuroscientific findings relevant to understanding social
cognition have thus been interpreted in the context of the
brain’s capacities for complex mental representations. As such,
proposed mechanisms of social cognition have centered on
how the brain represents the social world to facilitate under-
standing. The dominant mechanisms proposed have been folk
psychological theoretical inference mechanisms (Gopnik and
Wellman, 1992), and mental simulation mechanisms (Gallese
and Goldman, 1998; Goldman, 2006). More recently, others
have challenged this view to take into account the role of
the body and interaction with others in the environment. To
review these approaches, we first summarize Theory Theory
(TT) and Simulation Theory (ST) accounts of social cogni-
tion. We then discuss more recent embodied accounts of social
cognition and conclude with interactionist’s accounts of social
cognition.
THEORY OF MIND—THEORY THEORY AND SIMULATION THEORY
Drawing from developmental psychology and neuroscience, two
proposed mechanisms have been largely dominant in discussions
of social cognition. These mechanisms focus on the roles of
folk psychological theorizing and mental simulation to advance
knowledge on how humans can understand the mind of another.
Accordingly, the theoretical paradigms built up from these pro-
posed mechanisms are known as TT (see Gopnik and Wellman,
1992, 2012) and ST (see Blakemore and Decety, 2001; Goldman,
2006). Whereas TT posits that we develop an inferential theory
of others’ mental states to understand them, ST argues there is
no need for such theories as one can use their own mind as a
model to understand another’s mind (cf., Gallagher, 2008). Here,
it should be noted that “simulation” as used by proponents of ST
refers to a mental representation of another person’s behavior,
and not to be confused with “embodied simulations,” which
are non-introspective simulations that assume direct mapping
of perception to action (see Gallese, 2007, 2009) or activations
of motor representations (e.g., Barsalou, 2008). A fundamental
assumption within both TT and ST approaches to social cognition
is that the underlying mental states of another person must be
worked out cognitively in order to understand them; the so-called
“access problem” (Gangopadhyay and Miyahara, 2014). Specifi-
cally, both approaches describe processes of reasoning and judg-
ment humans use to understand others’ mental states. In short,
a mediating interpretational process—theorizing or simulation—
is argued to be the means for understanding the intentions and
mental states of others (see Di Paolo and De Jaegher, 2012).
Theory theory and ST approaches have provided rich, detailed
accounts of social-cognitive processes, but there are two pri-
mary challenges to this area of theorizing—coming from both
behavioral and neuroscientific work. On the behavioral side, one
concern has to do with the nature of the interaction typically
employed in traditional theory of mind (ToM) studies. On the
neural side, a related concern has to do with the lack of specificity
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Table 1 | Theoretical perspectives relevant to integrative account of social cognition.
Theory Key Level(s) of Underpinning Authoritative
assumptions framework mechanisms references
Theory of mind • Extra-perceptual mechanisms are • Baron-Cohen (1995)
required for understanding • Gopnik and Wellman (1992)
another’s mental states
• Third-person mindreading— • Sub-personal • Inferential simulation • Blakemore and Decety (2001)
observational rather than • Personal • Theoretical inference • Goldman (2006)
interactive form of understanding • Frith and Frith (2007, 2008, 2012)
others
• Individualistic cognitive processing • Saxe et al. (2004)
Interactionism • Mental states are directly • De Jaegher (2009)
perceivable through a • De Jaegher et al. (2010)
person’s embodiment
• Social cognition at the • Sub-personal • Embodied intentionality
supra-individual as evolving
between interactions • Personal • Gallagher (2008)
• Supra-individual • Social affordances • Gangopadhyay and Schilbach (2012)
• Cognition and perception are
for actively relating to the
environment
Dual process theories • Two distinct types of cognitive • Type 1 cognitive
processes processes—
automatic and • Evans (2008)
stimulus driven
• Type 1 processes are • Sub-personal • Type 2 cognitive • Frith and Frith (2007)
evolutionarily older • Personal processes—controlled • Lieberman (2007)
and flexible
• Type 2 processes are
evolutionarily recent
Ecological psychology • Body and environment play a • Direct perception via • Chemero (2003)
constitutive role in understanding dorsal visual system • Gibson (1979)
the social world
• Perception is not inferential • Sub-personal • Kinematic Specific • McArthur and Baron (1983)
Dynamics • Norman (2002)
• Perception and cognition serve an • Personal
adaptive function providing an • Supra-individual • Perception-action loops • Runeson and Frykholm (1983)
organism with means for direct • Valenti and Good (1991)
interaction with the environment
Enactive cognition • Perceptions are actively brought
forth through engagement
with the environment
• Perception is an active • Sub-personal • Participatory • De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2013)
sense-making process that • Personal sense-making • Froese and Ziemke (2009)
prepares an organism for action • Supra-individual • Social interaction • Noë (2004)
• Perception of invariant information
relies on specific motor actions
Brunswik’s lens model • Proximal stimuli are perceivable • Sub-personal • Probabilistic • Brunswik (1956)
features of the environment functionalism • Cooksey (1996)
• Distal features are objective • Personal
states of the environment, • Supra-individual • Causal ambiguity • Doherty and Kurz (1996)
not necessarily perceivable • Vicente (2003)
Dynamical systems • Interactions follow dynamic laws • Sub-personal • Coupling of perception-
that structure and constrain • Personal action systems • Marsh et al. (2009a)
joint perception-action systems in • Supra-individual • Coupling of organism • Marsh et al. (2006, 2009b)
self-organizing patterns to environment • Vallacher and Nowak (1997)
• Dynamic laws are emergent • Richardson et al. (2014)
across all size ranges of
social units over varying
temporal scales
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about the nature of the ostensive mentalizing network. We next
briefly review these concerns.
At issue from the behavioral standpoint, many ToM studies
have been criticized as being limited in their explanatory power
because they adopt a “third person” observational perspective
to social cognition (Di Paolo and De Jaegher, 2012; Przyrembel
et al., 2012). That is, to a large degree, research adopting a TT
or ST stance to social cognition requires that participants make
observational social judgments in regards to stimuli, such as pic-
tures or video clips, as opposed to an active engagement in social
interaction. This approach to social cognition research elides the
fact that social cognition primarily occurs during interactions,
where a person is actively using their social-cognitive abilities to
favorably advance the interaction.
Relatedly, recent research in neuroscience has shown that dif-
ferent brain regions are active in response to social “observation”
compared to social “interaction” (Tylén et al., 2012). Using a
combination of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
and eye-tracking, this research found that when participants
observe a person manipulating an object, regions of the medial
prefrontal cortex, the right inferior frontal gyrus, and the right
inferior parietal lobule activate in response. In contrast, when
viewing a character showing an object to the participant, meant
to mimic a simple social interaction, activation in the right
posterior temporal sulcus increases. Though, in both conditions,
participants viewed video clips, the ostensive cues associated with
showing an object to participants, compared to just manipulating
the object, appear to have transformed the experience from a
purely observational task to an interactive one (cf. Wilms et al.,
2010). Further, when considering the fairly large body of work
in neuroscience on ToM, the mentalizing network appears quite
vast, involving a large number of regions and inter-connections.
Indeed, according to a recent meta-analysis of neuroimaging
studies on ToM (Mar, 2011), the mentalizing network includes the
medial prefrontal cortex, the bilateral posterior superior temporal
sulcus, bilateral angular gyri, bilateral anterior temporal areas,
posterior cingulate cortex, precuneus, and the inferior frontal
gyrus. However, as noted, an important qualifier here is that most
neuroscience research interested in social interaction has only
studied “pseudo interaction” (Przyrembel et al., 2012). That is,
while research like that by Tylén et al. (2012) is a step in the
right direction towards studying social interaction, it should be
taken as tentative empirical evidence for neural regions associated
with social cognitive processes given that the activations may be
different during real social interaction.
There have even been attempts to synthesize TT and ST into
hybrid accounts (e.g., Carruthers and Smith, 1996; Nichols and
Stich, 2003), noting the possible roles of both mechanisms in
social cognition. Though neuroscientific findings have been used
to support TT, ST, and hybrid accounts, the evidence marshaled
in favor of these accounts does not appear sufficient to favor
one view over another. This suggests a need for social cogni-
tion researchers to establish new models of social cognition (see
Apperly, 2008). We support this line of thinking to argue that
these issues converge on a need for social cognitive neuroscience
to move beyond the ST/TT accounts and provide a more com-
prehensive view of social cognition. While acknowledging the
role of TT and ST mechanisms for understanding social cogni-
tion, assigning primacy to either or both of these mechanisms
has been a significant criticism from opponents of these views
(Di Paolo and De Jaegher, 2012). Instead, shifting the focus of
social cognition research to include embodied forms of social
interaction may be necessary in order to further advance the
scientific understanding of social cognition (see Schilbach et al.,
2013; Schilbach, 2014).
(EMBODIED) SOCIAL COGNITION
While the aforementioned work has contributed significantly to
our understanding of social cognition, at issue is that this more
cognitivist paradigm does not adequately consider the influence
of the rest of the body, or the environment, on cognition.
Conflicting theoretical accounts argue that the brain may not
require complex amodal mental representations of the social
world in order for the individual to understand it and engage in
appropriate adaptive behaviors. This new paradigm emphasizes
the importance of embodied and socially situated cognition (see
Varela et al., 1991; Chemero, 2013; Semin and Smith, 2013;
Wilson and Golonka, 2013).
In some cases, cognitivist accounts of cognition have been
refashioned to better account for the role of the body and envi-
ronment, by suggesting that, rather than abstract and amodal
mental representations, such representations are inherently linked
to their perceptual modality (e.g., Barsalou, 2008, 2010; Pezzulo
et al., 2011) and these modal representations are what enables
understanding of the social environment (Niedenthal et al., 2005).
This form of grounded cognition (Barsalou, 2008, 2010) empha-
sizes the role of bodily states, situated actions, and the environ-
ment on cognition, though it still maintains that cognition results
from the processing of mental representations, albeit linked to
neural representations of modality.
In other cases, the embodied cognition paradigm posits, more
radically, that both an individual’s body and environment are
all that is needed for social cognition. They argue that there is
no need for the brain to constantly maintain highly complex
mental representations, whether modal or amodal, in order to
understand the social world (Barrett et al., 2007; Marsh et al.,
2009b). That is to say that the body and the environment play
a constitutive role, and, thus, lighten the cognitive responsibilities
of the brain (Wilson, 2002). In such accounts, the resources avail-
able to an individual include the brain, body, environment, and
their relationships, underpinned by tightly coupled perceptual
motor systems. More generally across these accounts, theories of
embodied cognition posit that perception and action are deeply
interrelated in such a way that the brain and body actively rely on,
and make use of, the environment for effective interactions (e.g.,
Marsh et al., 2006; Barsalou, 2008).
Relevant to social cognition, this embodied approach has
encouraged the development of theories that explain how the
environment provides a person with the information necessary
to directly perceive and understand socially relevant informa-
tion, particularly during interaction (Gallagher, 2008; Gallagher
and Varga, 2013). This theoretical position argues that social
beings rely primarily on perceptual processes, and not necessarily
on extra-perceptual, or more conceptual processes, in order to
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understand the social world (cf., Bowlby’s (1969) discussion of
perceptual building bricks; see also IJzerman and Koole, 2011).
Likewise, the embodied perspective has allowed for reinterpre-
tations of developmental, cognitive, and neuroscientific findings
that provide a more cohesive and cogent framework of social
cognition, taking into consideration the role of the body and the
environment, as well as the brain’s ability to perform complex
operations to understand the social world (e.g., Bohl and van den
Bos, 2012).
INTERACTION THEORY
In contrast to TT and ST approaches, and more in line with
embodied theories, Interaction Theory (IT) features social cog-
nition during interaction more prominently (Gallagher, 2008).
Additionally, unlike proponents of strong versions of TT and
ST, IT theorists do not assume the unobservability of others’
minds1. That is, IT theorists posit that the mental states of others
can be directly perceivable, without necessarily needing to call
upon extra-perceptual processes, such as inferential theorizing
or mental simulation (Gallagher, 2008; Gallagher and Varga,
2013). According to IT, the social information perceived during
interactions allows for the immediate and rapid understanding of
the beliefs, emotions, and intentions of other agents. Notably, the
emphasis on social interaction has led some theorists to submit
that the experience of direct perception of others’ mental states
may only be possible during social interaction (e.g., De Jaegher,
2009).
IT-based views have emerged in social cognitive neuroscience
that elaborate on the kind of information that support this
direct perceptual grasp of another’s mental states. For example,
Gangopadhyay and Schilbach (2012) posit that during social
interactions, humans are able to directly perceive others’ men-
tal states through perception of their embodied intentionality.
In other words, during interaction, the body presents richly
structured information conveying to a perceiver certain types
of social interaction. This notion is similar to what we will
later describe as social affordances. However, on this view, it is
hypothesized that motor resonance mechanisms, defined as the
“automatic activation of motor control systems during percep-
tions of actions” (Chaminade and Cheng, 2009, p. 287), under-
pin the direct perception of mental states and further present
unique opportunities for action, interaction, and coordination
(Gallagher, 2008; Gangopadhyay and Schilbach, 2012). Motor
resonance mechanisms are thought to draw from the mirror
neuron system; a system comprised of a special class of neurons
which show activation during actions taken by an individual
as well as the observation of the same action taken by another
(Mukamel et al., 2010). Not only do such systems support mirror-
ing behaviors, but also, motor resonance mechanisms are claimed
to allow for a more direct grasp of others’ intentions (Iacoboni
et al., 2005; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010)2 and direct perception
of affordances (Garbarini and Adenzato, 2004). According to
1Weaker versions of TT and ST also do not strictly assume that all mental states
are unobservable; see Bohl and Gangopadhyay (2013).
2However, see Cook et al. (2014) for an alternative interpretation of mirror
neuron function.
IT, not only does embodied intentionality provide information
regarding the mental states of others, but when the intentionality
is shared, such as when working towards a common goal, the
information constrains the temporal and coordinative dynamics
of the interaction (Gangopadhyay and Schilbach, 2012), such as
those required for joint action (Sebanz et al., 2006).
In sum, IT contributes to an integrated account of social
cognition through its embodied view of cognition, its emphasis
on the direct perception of others’ mental states and opportunities
for interaction, its linkage to neural mechanisms, and lastly, by its
emphasis on crucial factors of social interaction such as context
and environment (Bohl and van den Bos, 2012). We turn now to
a discussion of how the aforementioned theories can be more fully
integrated in service of providing a more robust account of social
cognition.
INTEGRATING, TT, ST, EMBODIED AND INTERACTIONIST THEORIES
Given the state of social cognition research, encompassing a large
body of behavioral and neuroscience literature, researchers have
recently attempted to integrate and synthesize these approaches
into a coherent framework as a means of systematically exploring
social cognition. One such framework has been posited by Bohl
and van den Bos (2012), which utilizes a multi-layered framework
that spans the sub-personal, personal, and supra-individual levels
in order to understand the roles of theorizing, simulation, and
direct perception in social cognition (see Figure 1). Personal
processes are those at the level of the individual and her behavior,
describable using intentional language. This level is most familiar
to social cognition researchers, as the personal level is the most
common target of social cognition research. Attributions of “She
is sad” or “I want this paper to get published” are person-level
attributions. Both TT and ST posit mechanisms that allow for
mental state understanding at the personal level, as it is the
individual who either theorizes about, or mentally simulates,
the behavior of another agent. Sub-personal processes are those
at the level of nervous system functioning, such as neuronal
activation. This is the focus of social cognitive neuroscience
research, typically. This distinction between the personal and sub-
personal levels has a long history in the cognitive science literature
(e.g., Dennett, 1969), upon which Bohl and van den Bos (2012)
have extended to include the supra-individual level. The supra-
individual level processes are those found outside the individual,
such as environmental or situational contexts as well as temporal
dynamics.
By incorporating dual-process theories of cognition into the
overall framework, this multi-layered approach highlights crucial
distinctions between those levels, providing data rich explanatory
power to social cognition researchers. Likewise, this framework
extends recent integrative accounts beyond the level of the indi-
vidual (cf. Beer and Ochsner, 2006). Our aim here is not to
reiterate the specific details in this framework, as this has already
been done by Bohl and van den Bos (2012). Rather, we briefly
emphasize several contributions this framework provides to social
cognition in order to gain a more holistic understanding that can
contribute to future directions in the field.
First, this framework leverages dual-process theories to aid
in explaining social cognition. Cognitive psychology has rich
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FIGURE 1 | Bohl and van den Bos’ 2012 integrative framework for social cognition (Figure as originally published in Bohl and van den Bos (2012)).
history of research in this area going back decades (Schneider and
Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977; Kahneman, 2011).
Briefly, dual-process theories argue that humans possess two
main types of information processing mechanisms (see Birnboim,
2003; Evans, 2008; Evans and Stanovich, 2013). Automatic and
stimulus-driven processing of information comprises Type 1 pro-
cessing, while Type 2 processing is thought to be more con-
trolled, cognitively flexible, and reflective. From an evolutionary
perspective, Type 1 processing may have arisen earlier than Type 2
processing. These two processing types follow different pathways
evident at the neural and functional levels, and emergent at the
personal level (Bargh, 1984; Chaiken and Trope, 1999; Satpute
and Lieberman, 2006; Lieberman, 2007; Frith and Frith, 2008,
2012; Adolphs, 2009). This distinction between automatic and
controlled processing of information has provided a useful frame-
work for understanding cognition generally (Birnboim, 2003;
Adolphs, 2009), with researchers beginning to utilize this frame-
work to better understand social cognition in particular (e.g.,
Frith and Frith, 2008; Bohl and van den Bos, 2012; Wilkinson and
Ball, 2013). In line with dual-processing accounts, recent evidence
in support of neurally dissociable perceptual and cognitive sys-
tems at play during social cognition was found when juxtaposing
images and text in the processing of emotion (Sessa et al., 2014).
Accordingly, Bohl and van den Bos (2012) have proposed
that direct perception of mental states is processed by Type 1
cognition, while the processes proposed by TT and ST occur
as a result of Type 2 cognitive processes. These processes func-
tion in an interdependent and reciprocal fashion at the sub-
personal level (Figure 1, arrow 1), but differentially express
themselves at the personal level (arrows 3, 4). In line with one
of the critiques we summarized earlier, they further propose
that second-person research would allow for a more complete
understanding of the roles of Type 1 and Type 2 process-
ing in social cognition, in contrast with the traditional third-
person observer research. Finally, IT emphasizes that any account
of social cognition must extend beyond the individual level
to that of the supra-individual level in which crucial factors
that directly influence the sub-personal level such as interac-
tion, context, and environment are considered (see Figure 1,
arrow 2).
EMBODIED, EMBEDDED, AND ENACTIVE DIRECT
PERCEPTION
Thus far, we have provided a high-level summary of social
cognition research. The theoretical positions of TT and ST artic-
ulate evolutionarily advanced, extra-perceptual cognitive mech-
anisms (i.e., theoretical inference and mental simulation) that
facilitate mental state understanding (e.g., Gopnik and Wellman,
1992; Blakemore and Decety, 2001) and successful interaction.
These approaches to social cognition research have, however,
been relatively neglectful of social cognition during interaction.
But social interaction features prominently in IT. Social infor-
mation perceived during interactions allows for the possibility
of automatic and direct understanding of the mental states of
another agent (e.g., Gallagher and Varga, 2013). And, as shown
in our brief review of Bohl and van den Bos (2012), the different
mechanisms posited by TT, ST, and IT can be integrated into
a single overarching framework of social cognition by aligning
their proposed functions and utilities with those of two types of
cognitive processing from cognitive psychology and neuroscience.
It is our view that Bohl and van den Bos’ (2012) integrative
framework of social cognition serves as a promising start, and one
that we wish to further extend. Our extension centers on what
we see as a conflation of social cognition with social perception.
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The former refers to the pattern of judgments, attributions and
inferences we make about the motivations and mental states of
others while the latter refers to our perception of the behavior of
others. These processes are obviously inextricably linked, and, as
has been argued elsewhere (Wilson and Golonka, 2013), any the-
ory of cognition must start with a description of the informational
basis for perception. A theory of social perception must, therefore,
begin with a description of the information available for the
perception of others, including their mental states. This represents
a crucial distinction not yet accounted for by frameworks of social
cognition, particularly those that include direct perception such
as Bohl and van den Bos (2012).
The question then becomes: what social phenomena can be
directly perceived and how might this occur? In answer to this
question, we next turn to what we see as two complementary
notions of direct perception: direct perception stemming from
ecological psychology in embodied and embedded accounts of
cognition (Chemero, 2009) and direct perception in enactive
views of cognition (De Jaegher, 2009; Gallagher and Varga, 2013).
Our goal, then, is to articulate an account of social perception
starting with the informational basis of what can be directly
perceived and articulating the ways in which this supports and
informs other social cognitive mechanisms. In doing so, we pro-
vide a more detailed articulation of potential underlying mech-
anisms for social cognition, by offering an empirical means for
reconciling radical and non-radical views of cognition. Towards
that end, we turn next to a discussion of the embodied and
embedded as well as enactive approaches to perception. This lays
the foundation for a set of theoretical propositions meant to guide
social cognition research.
EMBODIED AND EMBEDDED DIRECT PERCEPTION
Understanding the embodied and embedded approach to per-
ception, action, and cognition, drawing from the ecological per-
spective, serves to enrich our understanding of not only the
contributions gained from integrating the interactionist and ToM
approaches to social cognition, but also the mutuality of an
organism-environment systemic relationship (Marsh et al., 2006).
From this perspective, human nervous systems, brains, and cog-
nition are evolved adaptations that serve the purpose of planning
and executing coordinated and goal-oriented actions with both
the physical and social environment (Glenberg, 1997; Kaschak
and Maner, 2009). Viewing cognition as an adaptation elucidates
the notion that it is “shaped by a dynamic interplay among the
nature of one’s nervous system, the nature of the environment
in which one lives, and the manner in which one’s body can
move in that environment” (Kaschak and Maner, 2009, p. 1237).
From the ecological perspective, cognition evolved from a need
to “coordinate and integrate increasingly complex behavioral
repertoires across time and space” (Marsh et al., 2009a, p. 321)
and that the distinction between perception, action, and cognition
is an arbitrary one (Anderson et al., 2012).
Through an organism’s embodiment it is considered closely
coupled with, not only its physical environment, but also its social
environment (Anderson, 2005). On the embodied and embedded
account, much of the information that an organism needs to
engage in adaptive action is available within the environment
and thus, does not always need to be mentally represented, as
cognitivists propose (Brooks, 1991, 1999; Chemero, 2013). On
this account, the necessary information is in the environment
and, therefore, does not need to be represented. Perception, in
such accounts, is thought of as direct. Embodied and embedded
direct perception, then, is perception that is non-inferential, does
not rely on mental representations, and is not always accurate
(Chemero, 2009). This means that an organism directly perceives
its environment as inherently meaning-laden in terms of what it
can do in that environment; that is, an organism directly perceives
affordances (i.e., opportunities for action; Gibson, 1979).
The notion of an affordance is a central concept in Gib-
son’s theory of direct perception. In these terms, the function
of perception is to enable action, and this is achieved by the
direct perception of objects and surfaces in terms of the actions
that can be performed with those objects. Affordances are thus
necessarily a relationship between the perceiving agent and her
environment; they reflect a reciprocity (Lombardo, 1987) between
the action capability of the perceiver and the properties of objects
in the environment. On this account, affordances are directly per-
ceivable because there is information available to an organism’s
perceptual systems that specify that affordance with respect to
the abilities of the perceiving organism (Marsh et al., 2009b).
Information is defined as a pattern in ambient stimulation (e.g.,
the ambient optic array) that is always present when, and only
when, the affordance is present. Because such patterns remain
across changes in viewing conditions, such as distance, viewing
angle, or illumination levels, they are said to remain invariant
across transformations.
While much research on affordances emphasizes interaction
with physical aspects of the environment, given that humans are
fundamentally embodied and embedded in both a physical and
social environment, Gibson’s theory of affordances is relevant
for understanding social processes (e.g., McArthur and Baron,
1983; Zebrowitz and Collins, 1997). In fact, Gibson even noted
that, “other animals afford above all, a rich and complex set
of interactions, sexual, predatory, nurturing, fighting, playing,
cooperating, and communicating” (Gibson, 1979, p. 128). It is our
contention that social affordances can thus be taken to mean the
opportunities for social interaction presented by verbal and non-
verbal social behaviors as well as opportunities for coordinative
action not available to an individual alone (McArthur and Baron,
1983; Valenti and Good, 1991; Kono, 2009).
This theoretical perspective has been empirically examined in
a variety of domains. Examples of social affordances include: the
alteration of the kinematic behavior during a feeding paradigm
as a function of one interactor requesting to be fed through the
opening of the mouth or direction of gaze (Ferri et al., 2011),
reach-to-grasp kinematics as a function of manipulation of object
relationship and interactor grip and gaze type (Scorolli et al.,
2014), transitioning from moving planks of wood individually
to moving the planks with another as a function of the scale of
the plank relative to the collective action possibility of the two
individuals together (Richardson et al., 2007; Isenhower et al.,
2010), judging the aperture width for which an adult-child dyad
can pass through on the basis of the scaled body dimension of
the dyad as a whole (Chang et al., 2009), and the synchronous
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exchange of multi-modal behaviors such as facial expressions and
gestures during a collaborative task (Louwerse et al., 2012). As
such, social affordances provide insight into ways which humans
engage in embodied cooperation and execute joint coordinative
actions toward shared goals (Baron and Boudreau, 1987).
This conceptualization of social affordances can be character-
ized as that which enables a joint coupling of perception-action
systems of more than one individual (Valenti and Good, 1991).
Indeed, there is an increasing trend in the cognitive sciences to
study the emergent social interaction dynamics that occur in
the world rather than the cognitive processing occurring in the
head (e.g., Marsh et al., 2006; Barrett et al., 2007; De Jaegher,
2009; Marsh et al., 2009b; De Jaegher et al., 2010). Accordingly,
the types of social interaction afforded by a given situation are
governed by dynamic laws that constrain motor systems of the
body, the coupling of perception-action systems, as well as the
coupling of person and environment (Good, 2007; Marsh et al.,
2009a). Social interaction dynamics, then, “reflect a continuous
flow of adjustments in the actions of one individual in response
to perceiving the actions of the other and the flow of information
from the individual’s own movement” (Marsh et al., 2006, p. 8).
In sum, social affordances and social interaction dynamics
are the first component of our framework for integrating social
cognition. In adopting this view of direct perception, we con-
tribute to the aforementioned framework of social cognition by
providing a level of specificity at the supra-individual level not
detailed by Bohl and van den Bos (2012). We argue that, in the
embodied and embedded account, direct perception is of social
affordances and perceiving such action opportunities does not
necessitate any mental state understanding between interactors
(Marsh et al., 2009b). This is not to say that mental state under-
standing is not important for social interaction; rather, it is meant
to draw attention to the interconnectivity of all the bodily systems
involved when engaging in joint action with others (Marsh et al.,
2009b). As we have alluded to before, social interaction is inher-
ently complex and dynamic. Therefore according to this account,
social interaction is driven, at least in cases of joint action and
embodied cooperation, by meaning-laden information available
in the physical and social environment. While this account of
direct perception provides insight with regard to perceiving inter-
action possibilities without a need for mental state understanding,
we turn next to the enactive account of direct perception that
provides us with insight into how others’ mental states may be
perceived.
ENACTIVE DIRECT PERCEPTION
One of the major critiques regarding Bohl and van den Bos’
(2012) integrative framework is that it conflates interactionism
with enactivism (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2013). In enactivism,
the experience of perception is not one that occurs solely in one’s
head; rather, perceptions are enacted or actively brought forth
through an organism’s engagement and sensorimotor exploration
of its environment (Varela et al., 1991; Froese and Ziemke, 2009).
In other words, an organism is not a passive receiver of informa-
tion who must translate environments into internal representa-
tions and then add meaning or value to said perceptions; instead,
through an active sense-making process, the world is perceived
as meaningful (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007). The enactive
view of perception differs from the embodied and embedded view
in that perception of invariant information relies upon specific
motor actions and these actions, themselves, constitute the said
perception (see Noë, 2004; Mossio and Taraborelli, 2008; Barrett,
2011). In other words, while the two approaches to perception
share many similarities, the key difference resides in the fact
that the enactive view incorporates specific neural predictions
suggesting that direct perception is the persistent linkage of both
sensory information with motor activations for a given stimulus
(Mossio and Taraborelli, 2008).
Specific to the study of social cognition in enactivism is the
notion of participatory sense-making. This construct is encap-
sulated by the idea that social interaction is central to social
cognition. The enactive view uses this construct to describe the
process of how social meaning is mutually constructed through
interactions and is affected by patterns of coordination, as well
as the breakdowns and recoveries inherent to the interaction
(De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007, 2013; De Jaegher, 2009). For
example, imagine a case where a manager calls her assistant into
her office because a report did not get sent out in time. The tone
of voice and facial expression of the manager informs the assistant
that something is wrong. The manager inquires as to why the
report was not sent and the assistant recognizes what was wrong.
But, a response indicative of defensive behaviors is conveyed by
the assistant. Through discussion, the assistant explains she did
not recall being told the report needed to be sent out, rather,
just completed by the date given by the manager. The manager
realizes she was not clear enough in her prior instructions to the
assistant. This brief example demonstrates participatory sense-
making in that social meaning can be co-constructed during
social interaction.
Enactive direct perception is critical to participatory sense-
making and suggests that, when an individual encounters some
other, they can “have a direct perceptual grasp of the other
person’s intentions, feeling, etc.” (Gallagher, 2008, p. 535). Specif-
ically, the perceptually available information provided by a per-
son’s motor movements, expressions on their face, as well as
their gestures, at least in normal, everyday contexts, is enough to
allow for social understanding to be achieved (Gallagher, 2008;
De Jaegher, 2009). The theorizing of Gallagher (2008) and De
Jaegher (2009) have been instrumental in articulating an enactive
account of direct social perception, but Gallagher and Varga
(2013) provide the most concise and compelling argument. In this
account, Gallagher and Varga describe direct social perception
in a way that complements and elaborates upon the definition
given in ecological psychology. In their account, social perception
is enactive meaning that perception of others’ actions is in terms
of responses to those actions and not necessarily in terms of
their mental states. Direct perception, in this case, is not just a
sensory process, but also a preparedness for action that includes
the supporting sub-personal processes (neural activations). The
addition of these sub-personal processes, on this account, does
not add an inferential component to perception; rather, it con-
stitutes the meaning, and not just the surface features, of what is
perceived for purposes of engaging in interaction (see Gallagher,
2008; Gallagher and Varga, 2013).
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While they note that enactive direct perception is in terms
of responses to other’s action and not in terms of mental states,
Gallagher and Varga (2013) make a compelling case for the
direct perception of certain intentions and emotions conveyed
by other people; mental states that have often been argued
to not be available for perception. They note that motor and
proximal “intentions are in the movement, in the action, in the
environmentally attuned responses” (p. 6) and thus, there is a
perceivable intentionality because it is evident in the embodiment
of others (see also Gangopadhyay and Schilbach, 2012). In other
words, during interaction, we can easily see the intentions of
others through the actions they take and the associated bodily
movements with said actions. The authors support this claim by
referring to research showing that varying types of intentions are
discernable when viewing others’ actions, and even when viewing
decontextualized actions in the form of point-light displays, often
with a high-level of accuracy (see Sartori et al., 2011; Becchio et al.,
2012).
Further, the authors posit that, because emotions manifest in
physical and behavioral cues, and thus embodied by the individ-
ual expressing them (see also Niedenthal, 2007), emotions too
may be available to direct social perception. In such cases, the
authors point out that direct perception of emotion is subserved
by information. In this way, they acknowledge the importance
of situational and environmental cues as well in accurately per-
ceiving emotions and thus, scaffolding the perception of complex
emotions (see Gallagher and Varga, 2013, pp. 6–7). Of course,
when the direct perception of emotion relies on numerous cues
that are “free to vary” it becomes difficult to say when and under
which circumstances emotions are directly perceived. This, too,
points to the need for a better understanding of social information
in any account of social cognition.
COMPLEMENTARY NOTIONS OF DIRECT PERCEPTION
Both the embodied and embedded direct perception and enac-
tive direct perception represent the second component of our
framework for integrating social cognition. These are congruent
in that they provide an account of perception in terms of social
interaction possibilities. They differ in one primary aspect, how-
ever. The former focuses on the interaction dynamics specified
by invariant information provided by some social other, often for
purposes of engaging in joint and coordinative action. The latter
complements this by positing that the mental states (i.e., certain
intentions and emotions) and motor activations are a part of the
information directly perceived, even if what is perceived is not
explicitly in terms of mental states (e.g., Chemero, 2009; McGann,
2014). Put more succinctly, the integration of these two views
of direct perception means that there may be both kinematic
information as well as other behavioral cues directly indicative of
mental states available for perception. To bolster this argument,
we next provide an account of the informational basis for social
perception that allows us to better integrate these complementary
notions of direct perception.
INFORMATIONAL BASIS FOR SOCIAL PERCEPTION
To better understand social cognition generally, and direct social
perception in particular, we next provide a tentative outline of
an informational basis for social perceptions. In accordance with
Gibson’s (1979) theory of direct perception (see also Turvey et al.,
1981), information must take the form of an invariant pattern
in some medium to which the human perceptual systems are
sensitive, and that lawfully corresponds to some state of affairs
in the world. We start by reviewing research and theory related
to the kinematic specification of dynamics (KSD) principle and
elaborate on this idea with what we term the social cues and
signals distinction. Within this framework, we highlight a number
of relevant points that enrich our discussion of the informational
basis for social perception. From this, we offer a set of testable
propositions designed to further research on the boundaries of
direct social perception.
KINEMATIC SPECIFICATION OF DYNAMICS
We begin a tentative informational theory of social perception by
borrowing the principle of KSD (Runeson and Frykholm, 1981,
1983). According to the KSD principle, events in the world have
causes which lead to characteristic kinematic patterns. There is,
by natural law, a 1:1 mapping between the movement kinematics
of an event and its underlying cause.
This idea has not been without criticism, and the origins of
the controversy lie with Hume’s treatment of causality. In Hume’s
argument, we cannot know about the cause of an event, only its
motions. For example, when a rolling billiard ball strikes another,
and the second ball rolls away, Hume argues we only see the
motion of the first followed by the motion of the second, and
that the underlying causal force is not seen, and thus cannot
be known. Since then, psychology has mostly relied upon a
cognitivist solution to the problem of causality. Beginning with
Kant’s invocation of innate categories of thought, spanning to
Helmholtz’s unconscious inference and beyond, perceptionists
have generally agreed that the cause is not given in the senses
and must somehow be inferred. It was not until Michotte’s (1963)
groundbreaking work on the perception of causal events that
anyone took seriously the possibility that causal information
might be given after all. In Michotte’s experiments, observers
were shown simulations of novel collision events, in which the
timing of the collision varied systematically—specifically the
length of time the two colliding objects were in contact with
each other and how they moved while attached. Michotte found
that observers recognized collision events when the timing was
appropriate to a real collision, and spontaneously applied other
names to the other events with different timing (see Twardy
and Bingham, 2002, for a similar demonstration of observer
sensitivity to violations between kinematic patterns and their
underlying dynamics). In contrast to Hume, Michotte concluded
that such performance could not be based on passive asso-
ciations from past experience, because of the novelty of the
events, and must therefore involve identification of the event
itself.
Later, the work of Johansson (1973) laid the foundation of
modern event perception work when he created the patch-light
technique by attaching small lights to the major joints of human
actors and filmed them walking in the dark. This showed that
observers had little difficulty recognizing the events as humans
walking. In one study (Johansson, 1976), he showed observers
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short video clips of human patch-light walkers, and similar dis-
plays of marionette puppets engaged in the same action. Despite
the similarity in spatial patterns of the movements (i.e., both
displays depicted the same major joints moving in the same direc-
tions relative to each other), observers could easily distinguish the
biological motion from the non-biological, even when the video
clips were less than half a second in duration.
Afterward, multiple studies have demonstrated the wealth
of information that observers are able to perceive in displays
of patch-light actors, including the sex of the actor (Kozlowski
and Cutting, 1977), identity (Cutting and Kozlowski, 1977;
Loula et al., 2005), the amount of lifted weight (Runeson and
Frykholm, 1981), emotion (Dittrich et al., 1996; Pollick et al.,
2001; Atkinson et al., 2004), and even deceptive intent (Runeson
and Frykholm, 1983). In the series of studies conducted by
Runeson and Frykholm (1983), they filmed patch-light displays
of actors pretending to make a light box seem heavy when
lifted. Not only were observers able to detect the deception, they
were able to correctly judge the weight of the box. In another
variation, Runeson and Frykholm asked the actors to act like
the opposite gender. Again, observers were able to recognize the
deception, correctly recognizing both the actor’s true gender,
and the fact that they were mimicking the other gender. The
researchers concluded that “perceiving another person has two
aspects: true properties of person and action, and intentional
or communicative expressions (Runeson and Frykholm, 1983,
p. 610)”. In their analysis, information for both aspects is available
to the visual system, and both are separately perceived.
These studies led Runeson and Frykholm (1983) to present
a theory of person and event perception based on the KSD
principle. The underlying causal dynamics of an event gener-
ate a unique kinematic pattern of motion in that event. Per-
ception of movement kinematics thus reveals the underlying
dynamics (i.e., motions specify their causes). Variations in the
center of gravity between the sexes create different movement
dynamics in men and women, which then leads to differ-
ences in the spatio-temporal pattern of points in patch-light
displays. Variations of weight in a lifted box alter the center
of gravity of the lifter, leading to differences in the spatio-
temporal patterns of points in patch-light displays for lifters
of light vs. heavy boxes. One may attempt to make a light
box look heavy, most likely by moving slower than is neces-
sary and incorporating the lower limbs, but these deceptive
movements cannot alter the load on the body imposed by the
weight.
While later studies have continued to investigate the nature
of the patterns of motion that specify the causal event (e.g.,
Bingham, 1987; Bingham et al., 1995; Muchisky and Bingham,
2002; Wickelgren and Bingham, 2004, 2008; Bingham and
Wickelgren, 2008), this work has focused on mechanical events
(e.g., pendulums and other oscillatory events). While traditional
mechanics can be employed to understand the nature of the
mapping from dynamics to kinematics in such events, there
is as yet little understanding of how intentions, as a dynamic
cause of behavior, map to kinematics, and whether such map-
pings are unique and count as information. However, the work
of Becchio et al. (2012) is making headway in specifying the
types of intentions that can be perceived based on kinematics.
These authors claim that intention constrains the kinematics of
a reach-to-grasp movement, citing studies that found differences
in grip aperture and closing velocity as a function of the social
intent of the action (Becchio et al., 2008, 2010; Sartori et al., 2011).
Planning a reach involves selecting the appropriate movement
kinematics to achieve a goal, and thus must reflect the prior
intention; that is, why the agent is reaching. Other studies then
demonstrated that, based on just kinematic information avail-
able in patch-light displays, observers were able to discriminate
between reaches guided by different intentions (e.g., Manera et al.,
2011). Thus, the theory that intentional dynamics can and do
constrain movement kinematics, and that such movements can,
in principle, specify their causes, is reasonable and has tentative
empirical support. This must be the case if one were to claim,
as we and others do, that intentions are embodied (Runeson
and Frykholm, 1983; Mark, 2007; Gangopadhyay and Schilbach,
2012).
What remains then is to solve the problem of intentional
dynamics (e.g., Shaw and Kinsella-Shaw, 1988). A complete KSD
theory for social perception must address the issue of what
intentions are, and how they shape action. The work of Shaw and
Kinsella-Shaw (1988) has attempted to map out these questions,
as they have endeavored to develop an ecological mechanics to
account for the natural laws of goal-directed behavior. In this
view, intentions are not defined in a teleological sense (i.e., as an
assumed purpose behind any act), but as a mathematical operator
that governs goal-selection. Michaels (2003) has speculated that
such intentional dynamics can be used to define affordances as
quantities conserved “over the space-time interval between goal-
selection and goal achievement (p. 145).”
While there is much yet to be explained in this regard, KSD
represents the third component of our framework for integrating
social cognition. The point here is to emphasize that optical
information about others can exist, even in reduced viewing con-
ditions, such as patch-light displays. But, as most know through
their familiarity with social interaction, there is often a plethora
of information provided by a given social situation and, whether
through perceptual or cognitive processes, meaning is ascertained.
This leads us to the next part of our account on the informational
basis of social perception: the distinction between social cues and
social signals.
SOCIAL CUES AND SOCIAL SIGNALS
The social cues and social signals distinction (Vinciarelli et al.,
2009) has recently been employed in attempts to translate
insights from human social cognition to better understand the
social dynamics of human-robot interaction (Fiore et al., 2013;
Wiltshire et al., 2013, 2014b). However, it is also of general utility
for understanding human social cognition and, in particular,
detailing our account of the informational basis for social per-
ception. In line with embodied and embedded views of social
psychology (e.g., Marsh et al., 2009a), we suggest that social
cues and social signals provide the basis for linkage between the
theories that allow for an explication of social meaning spanning
the environment, the body, and the brain (Streater et al., 2012;
Lobato et al., 2013; Wiltshire et al., 2014b).
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At a fundamental level, we take the position that there are
physical and behavioral cues that comprise social cues, all of which
are available to an organism’s perceptual system in the environ-
ment and serve as channels of potentially useful information.
Physical cues, then, are those cues that convey aspects of an
organism’s physical appearance as well as environmental and
situational factors that are socially salient. Examples of a phys-
ical cue might be the type of clothing worn by a person or
the relative distance that that person may be from the person
perceiving them. By contrast, behavioral cues, then, are those
cues comprised by the “non-verbal movements, actions, and
gestures as well as verbal vocalizations and expressions using
the body and face” (Fiore et al., 2013, p. 2). In this way, phys-
ical cues are often viewed discretely whereas behavioral cues
tend to unfold dynamically. Of course, situations and environ-
ment, too, can unfold dynamically, but this is likely over a
larger temporal scale than behavioral cues. Consistent with these
papers, the term cue is not used here in the same sense as it
is used within the literature on direct perception to indicate
a sensory datum that requires inferential processing to ascer-
tain meaning. Rather, social cues are any data available to a
perceptual system that may support either inferential or direct
perception.
In a previous account, we noted that social signals are in
essence the meaningful interpretations of social cues as a func-
tion of the mental states and attitudes attributed to an agent
that displayed them (Fiore et al., 2013). However, in light of
the current discussion (i.e., to determine what social informa-
tion may be directly perceivable to humans), we refine this
to suggest that a social signal can be defined as the perceived
intention or mental state comprised by the combination of
observed social cues. This refinement leads to a question fun-
damental to this line of thinking: can social signals (the mean-
ing of the cues) be observable in the same way as social cues?
It is our view, and others, that it is possible to gain direct
access to social meaning (cf. Zebrowitz and Collins, 1997; Marsh
et al., 2009a; Gallagher and Varga, 2013), at least under some
circumstances, and in others, perhaps not (e.g., Freeman and
Ambady, 2011). That is, as alluded to previously, our aim is
to provide further elaboration on accounts of direct percep-
tion, but to also attempt to express the limitations of what
may be directly perceived and must therefore be inferred, at
least with regard to mental states experienced in the social
environment.
Drawing from the KSD principle, we argue that, in some
cases, social cues can be thought of as the kinematic movement
(especially behavioral cues) and the social signal can be thought
of as the underlying dynamic cause. In other words, mental
states such as intentions and emotions are linked to the motor
system in such a way that their presence is evident in motion
kinematics (Mark, 2007). If this is the case, then there should be
a 1:1 mapping between social cue(s) and a social signal (Runeson
and Frykholm, 1983). Likewise, in accordance with theories of
direct perception, perceiving information comes with knowledge
of a state of affairs in the world, when information is defined
as a lawful relationship between the information and the real-
world (Turvey et al., 1981; Turvey, 1992). This is an important
distinction because if such relationships exist, then social signals
must be treated as directly knowable, and as such, observable.
In other words, a definable and measurable relationship between
social cues and signals would provide support for the idea that
another’s mental states are directly observable. That being said,
some clarification with regard to this relationship is needed.
A social signal is directly perceived only when the structure
of an invariant set of cues yields perception without any need
for probabilistic inference (Zebrowitz and Collins, 1997). We
therefore propose the following:
Proposition 1. A lawful mapping between socials cues and social
signals would render social signals as observable in the environ-
ment and lend support to accounts of direct social perception only
if the set of social cues remains invariant as a function of their
invariant association with a particular social signal. That is, across
situations where specific actors and contexts vary, yet social signals
remain constant, there would be also an invariant pattern of social
cues that support social perceptual constancy.
As noted, the social environment is inherently complex and
dynamic. Social cues can constellate in many combinations and
their meaning (the signals) is contextually and culturally deter-
mined (Fiore et al., 2013). The process of understanding a person
occurs in real time and perhaps, a barrage of social cues can
be conveyed over short durations of time, some of which can
be conflicting (i.e., “sending mixed signals”). Because different
social cues are conveyed moment by moment, it can be difficult to
attribute meaning to social agents, when perhaps the cues being
displayed do not map neatly to one particular signal (cf. Freeman
and Ambady, 2011). This, in turn, warrants we mention debates
surrounding accuracy in social perception (see Kruglanski, 1989;
Fiske, 1993; Jussim and Zanna, 2005; for reviews). As noted,
direct perception does not need to be accurate (Chemero, 2009),
but as complexity increases in the number and combinations of
cues, so too, does the likelihood of making inaccurate perceptions
of the social signals (see Doherty and Kurz, 1996; Wiltshire
et al., 2014b). Therefore, in cases where the set of social cues
is not invariant and naturally specifying the social signal, it is
likely that the perception of the social signal will be probabilis-
tic (Jussim and Zanna, 2005). We thus propose the following:
Proposition 2. For cases where a mapping between social cues
and social signals does not exist, the interpretation of such cues
must necessarily be probabilistic and therefore, relies on extra-
perceptual processes rendering the social signal unobservable.
While future empirical work will need to differentiate which
social signals are directly perceivable and which ones are not,
we suggest that motor intentions, present intentions, and basic
emotional states are the most likely candidates (see Gallagher
and Varga, 2013). While some research has attempted to examine
direct perception of dispositional features such as personality
traits (e.g., Zebrowitz and Collins, 1997), we suggest that states
are more likely candidates for direct perception and traits likely
require extra-perceptual processes. More generally, in bolstering
the argument for these propositions, elaboration of Chemero
(2009) theory of information for direct perception and the
distinctions between projectable and non-projectable properties
are discussed to complement our social cues and social signals
framework. In much the same way as how optic flow research has
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provided geometric descriptions of the information potentially
available to perceivers (e.g., Nakayama and Loomis, 1974; Lee,
1976), our point is that research should here strive to describe the
actions of others and provide a kinematic and geometric analysis
of higher-order invariant patterns that can, in principle, work as
the social cues that specify social signals.
SITUATION SEMANTIC PERSPECTIVE OF INFORMATION
What is important to our argument is the notion that cognition
is socially situated (see Smith and Semin, 2007). One of the
fundamental ideas of this view is the fact that situations play a
foundational role in cognition and that cognition is often for the
purposes of adaptive social interaction (see Semin and Smith,
2013 for review). While a detailed argument for Chemero’s (2009)
situation semantic view of information can be found in his book,
our purpose for reviewing it here is to discuss how it relates to
our social cues and signals framework and the above propositions.
The situation semantic view of information dates back to Barwise
and Perry (1981), Barwise and Perry (1983) and posits that
information is a part of the natural world that exists in situations.
The underlying idea is that the meaning of a situation can
be carried by a token of that situation and this token, in turn,
carries information about a related situation if that situation
constrains the present situation (Chemero, 2009). On this view,
the idea that tokens can specify something else (e.g., the meaning
of the situation or other situations) is akin to what we posit with
regard to social cues and signals. That is, a social cue, or a set
of cues, can specify the meaning of a current social situation, a
certain interaction possibility, or perhaps, the mental states of
others. Further, the situation semantic view not only allows for
information to specify meaning through natural law, but also to
indicate conventions which may not be underwritten by natural
law (Turvey and Carello, 1985). We expect that further elabora-
tion in this vein might be fruitful for advancing this work given
that this ecologically sound perspective of information seems to
leave room for what might be construed of as direct and indirect
perception. Next, the distinction between projectable and non-
projectable properties, stemming from embodied yet representa-
tional approaches to perception, provide further elaboration of
these points.
PROJECTABLE AND NON-PROJECTABLE PROPERTIES
The distinction between projectable and non-projectable prop-
erties helps to further articulate cases in which social signals
might be directly perceived. The distinction, to our knowledge,
was first argued for in Epstein’s (1993) representational account
of perceptual systems and later reiterated in embodied accounts
of memory (Glenberg, 1997) and social cognition (Kaschak and
Maner, 2009). The general idea is that the environment con-
tains projectable properties that are objective features readily and
directly available for perceiving (Epstein, 1993; Kaschak and
Maner, 2009). Regarding a physical environment, this would
include, but is certainly not limited to, the spatial structuring
of the environment as well as the form, shape, and color of
objects. At a more general level, projectable properties are those
that are specifiable by light projected on to an organism’s optic
array (Epstein, 1993; Glenberg, 1997). On this account, there
are also, non-projectable properties of the environment that are
not readily available to perceptual systems, and thus require
further mental operations in order to glean the meaning of such
properties (Kaschak and Maner, 2009). An example of a non-
projectable property is object ownership (Schmidt, 2007), which
Glenberg (1997) argues can only be determined by drawing from
the memory of prior experiences and not from direct perception.
Our position, however, diverges from Kaschak and Maner at
the point that they provide their example of what is projectable
and non-projectable in the social environment. But, it is impor-
tant to note this difference in perspective here. With regards to the
social environment, Kaschak and Maner (2009) use the example
of gaze following, wherein the orientation of the face and eyes
are projectable properties; however, the notion that the eyes are
looking at and perceiving something is a non-projectable property
(see also Adams and Kleck, 2003). On our view, orientation of
the face and orientation of the eyes might represent two social
cues, and the fact that these cues are likely an invariant set of cues
signaling that the person is looking at and perceiving something
leads us to argue that this is directly perceivable.
The point here is not to argue this particular case of social cues
and signals, or any other for that matter. Instead, our point here
is to articulate this useful distinction as it appears to be necessary
for understanding what information is available for direct social
perception. Projectable properties are directly perceivable, but
they may or may not actually be perceived, depending on percep-
tual learning and attunement. In other words, detection and use
is something that requires attunement and calibration (Bingham
et al., 2001) and this likely applies to the social environment as
well. Perceptual learning is the process of discriminating oppor-
tunities for action from distinctive features of the environment
and invariant relationships as a function of the motor repertoire
of the embodied organism and reciprocally assigning salience
to environmental features (McArthur and Baron, 1983; Gibson,
2000; Pezzulo et al., 2011). Though beyond the scope of this paper,
some suggest that this process is explained by neural networks
and their ability to accrue experience and attune to changes in
cues and features of the environment that occur over time (e.g.,
Keysers and Perrett, 2004; Barrett et al., 2007). Regardless, over
time, perceptual learning and attunement occur to allow for the
affordances of projectable properties of the social environment
to become directly perceivable provided they afford a particular
action or interaction (Gibson, 2000; Barrett and Kurzban, 2006)
or perhaps, as enactivists might argue, others’ mental states (De
Jaegher, 2009; Gallagher and Varga, 2013). Summarizing this,
and framing it in the terms of social cues and signals, we propose:
Proposition 3. All social cues are projectable properties and there-
fore, some social signals can be directly perceived upon first
encounter if the cue set for that signal is invariant; whereas, there
are other social signals that, while they may not be immediately
perceived, can be through perceptual learning, attunement, and
calibration because they are comprised by projectable properties.
By contrast, non-projectable properties are not directly perceiv-
able3. Non-projectable properties can, perhaps, only be detected
indirectly using inferential mechanisms or, as Epstein (1993)
3To be clear, non-projectable properties are not to be confused with Witha-
gen’s (2004) notion of nonspecifying variables, which are projectable, but do
not contain specifying information.
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argues, be represented. We remain agnostic to the notion of repre-
sentation here. But, it would seem that non-projectable properties
of the social environment, therefore, can only be inferentially
perceived and, thus, according to Kaschak and Maner (2009),
require social interaction and the process of teaching and learning
in order to detect. One possibility is that more simple forms of
social cognition, such as brief interactions with strangers, may rely
almost exclusively on projectable properties; whereas, relatively
more complex forms of social interaction (e.g., involving the need
to think about combinations of relationships; Fiske, 2012), may
draw more heavily on non-projectable properties. In our terms,
we can then propose:
Proposition 4. Even though all social cues are projectable proper-
ties, some social signals are non-projectable and can thus never be
directly perceived. In such cases, more complex extra-perceptual
mechanisms are required to interpret the social signal conveyed by
social cues and this may be done through inferential, representa-
tional, simulative, or perhaps other mechanisms.
While only briefly elaborated upon here, social cues and social
signals represent the fourth component of our framework for
integrating social cognition. The ability to perceive projectable
properties and infer non-projectable properties of stimuli in the
environment has provided humans with an extended ability for
adaptive and flexible interaction with the environment. This is
an essential social cognitive capacity given the extent to which
the environments in which humans operate are fundamentally
social in nature (Kaschak and Maner, 2009). As is currently
known, humans exhibit the most complex social activity observed
spanning varying levels of social interaction, relations, and hier-
archies (Barrett et al., 2007). Therefore, to us, it seems plausible
that, because social information is so complex, it is not always
directly perceivable. However, there appears to be evidence that
the human perceptual system is equipped to directly perceive
social information, in the same way that it is equipped to directly
perceive physical information about the environment.
DORSAL VISUAL SYSTEM CONTRIBUTIONS TO DIRECT PERCEPTION
Norman (2002) reviewed psychological, neuroscientific, and neu-
ropsychological findings on the ventral and dorsal visual systems
in an attempt to draw parallels between the two visual systems
and constructivist (i.e., inferential) and ecological accounts of
perception. Relevant here, Norman (2002) proposed that a pri-
mary function of the dorsal system is to enable visually guided
behavior in our everyday life (see also, Milner, 1998; Milner
and Goodale, 2006; Binsted et al., 2007). Accordingly, the dor-
sal system processes visual information more quickly because
the magnocellular visual pathway (M-pathway), which provides
direct input to the dorsal system, has a higher temporal sensi-
tivity. Further, the dorsal system does not necessarily result in
conscious awareness of the perceived objects. This is supported
by evidence from patients with damaged or destroyed ventral
systems but intact dorsal systems who fail at identifying the
perceptual qualities of objects (e.g., size, shape), but nonethe-
less enact appropriate motor programmes when interacting with
those objects (e.g., accurate gripping of the object; Milner, 1998;
James et al., 2003). Likewise, the dorsal system does not appear
to rely on long-term representational memory, as the execution
of actions only requires short-term storage of information. From
this, Norman (2002) argued that the functions of dorsal system
align well with ecological psychology’s theories of visual per-
ception. Put another way, the dorsal system may be the visual
system allowing for direct perception as argued by Gibson (1979).
Though Norman’s primary focus was on how the ventral and
dorsal systems process the physical properties of objects, we
suggest that the same functions might allow for visually guided
social behavior in response to processing social cues and signals.
Norman characterizes the dorsal ventral system analogously to
descriptions of Type 1 processes described earlier (see, Evans and
Stanovich, 2013), making it an appealing candidate for integra-
tion into a framework of social cognition at the sub-personal
level.
Subsequent research on the dorsal visual system provides
some support for our suggestion. Rizzolatti and Matelli (2003)
examined the anatomy of the dorsal visual system and argued
that the dorsal stream is comprised of two visual streams: the
dorso-dorsal stream, which guides behavioral control, and the
ventro-dorsal stream, which plays a crucial role in the perception
of space and action. The dorso-dorsal pathway runs from the
superior parietal lobule to dorsal pre-motor areas, and gov-
erns control of online actions, while the ventro-dorsal pathway
progresses from the medial superior temporal area to ventral
areas of the pre-motor cortex, and is concerned with both the
perception of space and action understanding. Studies of stroke
patients have revealed that the posterior middle temporal gyrus
is a critical region for associating action with meaning (Kalénine
et al., 2010; see also, Binkofski and Buxbaum, 2013). Though this
research has largely focused on understanding actions in relation
to objects, such as tool use, we suggest it is possible that the
same network plays a crucial role in understanding the meaning
(i.e., the social signal) associated with generally observing social
cues.
Although research on the role of the magnocellular pathway
in processing social cues has been limited, we find further sug-
gestive evidence in favor of the above hypothesis from studies on
emotional facial expression. For example, there is evidence that
the M-pathway quickly processes emotional facial expressions
(Vuilleumier et al., 2003), as well as research showing M-pathway
abnormalities in individuals with disorders where processing
social information is impaired, such as schizophrenia-spectrum
disorders (Bedwell et al., 2013) and autism spectrum disorders
(Greenaway et al., 2013). The deficits in processing social infor-
mation found in these disorders could be a consequence of a
visual system, specifically the dorsal system components, with an
impaired ability to directly perceive relevant social information.
This emphasizes the potentially informative nature of investigat-
ing dorsal system processing of other social cues and signals. From
this, we propose the following proposition:
Proposition 5: The ability to directly perceive opportunities for
interaction or coordinative action (i.e., social affordances) is a
function of the dorsal visual system’s contribution to social cog-
nition. More specifically, the middle temporal gyrus functions as
a supramodal neural region critical for transforming perceived
social cues into meaningful social signals, though of course other
neural regions are likely involved in this process (Anderson,
2010). A corollary of this hypothesis posits that individuals with
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a dysfunctional dorsal system would be impaired in directly per-
ceiving social affordances due to an impaired ability to perceive
social cues.
In the final section of our paper, we draw from, and elaborate
upon the Brunswikian and Gibsonian integration proposed by
Vicente (2003). Our goal is to make our case and provide the
means through which we can more specifically define and mea-
sure the relationships between social cues and signals and thus,
direct social perception.
TOWARD AN INTEGRATIVE ACCOUNT OF SOCIAL
COGNITION
It is our view that to understand the mechanisms of social cog-
nition, and develop a more integrated research approach, there
is need to invoke explanatory pluralism (see Dale, 2008; Dale
et al., 2009). While some are skeptical of integrative approaches
(e.g., De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2013), we align with the view
of pluralism in cognitive science that a better understanding of
the mechanisms of social cognition, or cognition more generally,
requires the integration of competing theories into meta-level
frameworks that sustain the co-existence of each (see Dale, 2008).
Specifically, with the growing body of evidence for the various
proposed mechanisms of social cognition and the different levels
of explanation associated with each, it seems increasingly likely
that humans may have the capacity to employ each of these mech-
anisms during the various types of engagement with the social
environment (i.e., direct social perception, theoretical inference,
and simulation). While the aforementioned review provided us
with the theoretical scaffolding necessary to advance thinking in
social cognition, what is required is a means to test the afore-
mentioned propositions. Towards that end, we next elaborate on
how Vicente’s (2003) integration of Gibson’s affordances with
Brunswik’s Lens Model, provides us with the empirical scaffolding
to push this research forward.
Vicente (2003) proposes a theoretical integration between
Brunswik’s probabilistic Lens Model (see Brunswik (1956)) and
Gibson’s, in Vicente’s words, more deterministic direct perception
of affordances (see Gibson, 1979). The two approaches are both
aligned in that they focus on the relation of an organism and its
environment, but distinct in how perception of the environment
is conceptualized.
Brunswik’s (1956) core premise is that of probabilistic func-
tionalism. This means that, to understand how an organ-
ism accomplishes its goals (achievement), the aspects of that
agent’s environment that it attends and responds to in order to
attain those goals must be known (functionalism). In addition,
Brunswik’s approach is committed to the idea of causal ambiguity,
from which the relationship between environmental cues and an
organism’s perception of them is uncertain and, therefore, likely
to be probabilistic (probabilism; Doherty and Kurz, 1996). To
better understand the rationale for probabilism, the model relies
on the constructs of distal vs. proximal stimuli wherein, distal
stimuli are objective states of an organism’s environment and
proximal stimuli are the features of the environment perceivable
to the organism (Vicente, 2003). According to Vicente (2003),
“Brunswik believed that an organism is not able to perceive distal
stimuli directly but instead must infer what is going on in the
ecology from the imperfect (i.e., probabilistic) cues provided by
proximal stimuli” (p. 246). This view is thus a more radical
distinction than the projectable and non-projectable properties
discussed above as this would, in essence, posit that no perception
can be direct because it is always inferential.
By contrast, and as we have already discussed, Gibson (1979)
believed that perception could be direct in that meaning could
be perceived in the environment without the need for inferential
mechanisms and this was captured by the notion that direct
perception is of affordances. While many of the central tenets
of Gibson’s view have been detailed, Vicente’s (2003) integra-
tion corroborates this when he notes perception can only be
direct when there is a lawful mapping between an environmental
invariant and an affordance and that this relationship is what
counts as ecological information. Central to this is that direct
perception is an active rather than a passive process. In other
words, an organism is actively attuning to the information in the
environment for the purposes of engaging in interaction with it.
Ultimately, what Vicente (2003) suggested was that Brunswik’s
Lens model and Gibson’s Affordances are able to account for dif-
ferent, albeit, complementary, types of environmental interaction.
Put simply, “direct perception requires invariants, whereas judg-
ment and decision making require probabilistic cues” (Vicente,
2003, p. 259). Indeed, Gibson’s approach emphasizes perception-
action coupling whereas Brunswik merely emphasized percep-
tion. These distinctions are important for our argument about
social cognition, because the types of situations used in traditional
social psychology experiments have required people to make
passive judgments about social stimuli (cf. Good, 2007). As we
noted earlier, others have either called for, or emphasized, the
need for research to be conducted that examines more direct
perception-action links like those occurring during actual social
interactions and that do not necessitate more complex mental
operations (Vicente, 2003).
In terms of our social cues and signals framework, it is
our position that leveraging the theoretical integration provided
by Vicente is necessary to advance this work. Indeed, we have
recently elaborated on the use of the Lens Model in this context
(Wiltshire et al., 2014b). A key insight highlighted in that work
is that “Social Judgment Theory” (SJT; as detailed specifically by
Cooksey, 1996; Doherty and Kurz, 1996), which heavily relies
on Brunswik’s Lens Model, has not yet examined social judg-
ments in the sense that traditional social cognitive researchers
use it. For example, this would expand SJT research by asking
participants to make a judgment about the intentions, emotions
or other mental states of a target person. Related research has
employed the Lens Model to examine the relationship between
nonverbal cues and personality judgments (e.g., Gifford, 1994;
Hirschmüller et al., 2013), but to the best of our knowledge, this
work is distinct from what we propose here. Specifically, social
cue and signal judgments get more at the immediate, underling
intentionality or mental states whereas extant work examines
more stable dispositions that may not map onto mental states
at a given context-specific moment. Our novel contribution in
reiterating this here is that, although the Lens Model is used as a
technique for understanding the relationships between inherently
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org January 2015 | Volume 8 | Article 1007 | 14
Wiltshire et al. Prospects for direct social perception
probabilistic cues, we feel its use as an analytic scaffold will help to
advance our argument with regard to the propositions proposed
herein.
Figure 2 represents our repurposing of the Lens Model within
the social cues and signals framework. Drawing from efforts in
SJT (Hammond, 1993; Cooksey, 1996; Doherty and Kurz, 1996;
Vicente, 2003), our version of the Lens Model specifies how
perceptions or inferences of a social signal (SP) can be made
with regard to the proximal and projectable social cues (Ci) that
are available to an organism’s perceptual systems. If, indeed, the
perceived social signal (SP) matches the actual social signal (SA)
then this would lead to the achievement of social understanding.
As is tradition in SJT, the Lens Model serves as an analytic tool
to decompose the relationships between the components of the
model that ultimately represent a judgment process (see Cooksey,
1996). To do so, a number of values are needed. Ecological validity
coefficients (Ci,V) are the correlations between the actual social
signal (SP) and the social cues (Ci). In turn, the cue utilization
coefficients (Ci,U) are weights placed upon certain cues available
to that agent in its perception or inference that a certain social
signal indeed exists. Lastly, cue correlation coefficients represent
the correlation between each of the available social cues (Ci),
but a variable is not used to represent these here because the
correlation needed is factorial with regard to the number of cues.
That is, a correlation coefficient is required, for example, for the
relationship between C1 and C2, C1 and C3, C1 and C4, C2 and
C3, C2 and C4, and C3 and C4.
In short, this version of the Lens Model is proposed for two
purposes: to highlight a novel application of SJT (i.e., to study
the relationship between social cues and signals), and to convey
what might be necessary for direct social perception. This helps
set the stage for empirical examination (see Wiltshire et al., 2014b
for additional methodological issues). That is, the question then
is how to define an invariant set of cues with a lawful relationship
between the cues (Ci) and the perceived or inferred social signal
(SP) as argued for in Proposition 1. To address this, we propose:
Proposition 6. A lawful relationship between an invariant set of
social cues and the perceived social signal would manifest through
high cue correlation coefficients between all cues comprising the
set, and equally high cue utilizations coefficients.
Note here we do not propose perfect correlations as would be
expected by the 1:1 relationship proposed for direct perception
(e.g., Vicente, 2003), nor do we provide a specific threshold for
what constitutes “high correlations.” While this decision is open
to critique, we would like to leave this issue as a point of discussion
for empirical examination. But, perhaps, a relationship slightly
less than 1:1 may enable direct perception; whereas, a relationship
significantly less than 1:1 would require inference. To reiterate,
Brunswik’s weighting system in the Lens Model can range from
0 (e.g., no ecological validity of a cue) to 1 (e.g., perfect ecological
validity of a cue). Those weights, within some tolerance, but
otherwise very nearly perfect, are thus lawful and support direct
perception, whereas, we could conclude the remainder likely
supports inference. As McGann (2014) recently argued, direct
social perception needs to be sufficiently reliable to guide behavior
in normal situations, but does not necessarily have to be exception
free. This interpretation lends credence to our notion that direct
perception may be possible without a 1:1 relationship.
Criticisms of using the Lens Model as an analytic technique
to provide an index of direct social perception are, of course, to
be expected. For example, Zebrowitz and Collins (1997) noted
that the Lens Model is limited in the degree it can provide
theoretically meaningful cue configurations. In addition to this,
the Lens Model only captures a snapshot of social cognition a
posteriori, when in fact, social cognition occurs dynamically in
an ongoing stream of activity (McGann, 2014). Likewise, the
FIGURE 2 | A social cues and signals depiction of the Lens Model (Adapted from the works of Hammond, 1993; Cooksey, 1996; Doherty and Kurz,
1996; Vicente, 2003).
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interdependent processes of social perception and social cognition
are dynamic and interactive and, in order for any model of this
process to be ecologically valid, they must flexibly shift towards
different potential meanings in real time as different social cues
are conveyed (Freeman and Ambady, 2011). Additionally, another
limitation of the Lens Model is its artificial isolation of sender
and receiver in a social interaction. The inherent meaning of an
interaction resides ultimately in the relationship between two or
more agents who are both senders and receivers as they interact
over time. Therefore, to clarify, we propose this version of the
Lens Model here as a theoretical and analytic scaffold to structure
our argument and as a means to tractably test our propositions
on the relationships between social cues and signals, but do not
claim that the model proposed here fully captures the complexity
of social dynamics.
At a fundamental level, “social systems are dynamical systems”
and, thus, the study of such systems should be treated accordingly
(Richardson et al., 2014, p. 251). Indeed, research on direct
perception typically relies on the theories and tools of dynam-
ical systems (e.g., Chemero, 2009; see Richardson et al., 2014
for review). The dynamical systems perspective and associated
methodologies are of great utility here as these provide a means
of characterizing social interaction and the accompanying social
cognitive processes across sub-personal, personal, and supra-
individual levels. In the terms of this approach, examination
of these levels as an integrated unit of analysis is the study of
an organism-environment system (Järvilehto, 1998), which has
previously been extended to characterize social phenomena (e.g.,
Vallacher et al., 1994; Vallacher and Nowak, 1997; Dale et al., 2014;
Richardson et al., 2014). At this level of analysis, a more globally
meaningful and perhaps, lawful description and understanding of
social cognition is given through the emergent self-organizational
patterns evident across the multiple scales comprising social units
(e.g., Good, 2007; Coey et al., 2012). But to the best of our
knowledge, no guiding framework has been provided to map
the complexities and dynamics of social cognition across these
levels of analysis. As an initial attempt towards this, we propose
the schematic conveyed in Figure 3, which is our dynamical re-
envisioning of Bohl and van den Bos’ (2012) framework.
A thorough review of dynamical systems as applied to social
cognition and interaction is beyond the scope of the current
paper, and has been elaborated elsewhere (Coey et al., 2012; Dale
et al., 2014; Richardson et al., 2014). However, central to this, is
that dynamical systems are typically characterized by coupling
across different levels of organization (Wallot and Van Orden,
2012). The re-envisioning shown in Figure 3 is helpful because it
highlights the different levels of organization inherent to the study
of social cognition and coupling across the regions of the nervous
system associated with Type 1 or Type 2 processes, personal-level
experiences (P), bodies (B), and the (E) environment. This figure
highlights the fundamentally embodied and embedded nature of
agents engaging in social interaction. Therefore, while Figure 2
is a useful theoretical and analytical scaffold for mapping the
relationship between social cues and signals, Figure 3 can be used
as a means to map the interaction of the various components
comprising social units that are coupled at a given point in an
interaction, over various temporal scales (cf. Eiler et al., 2013).
FIGURE 3 | A dynamic representation of social cognition highlighting
interdependency and reciprocal influence across the regions of the
nervous system associated with Type 1 or Type 2 processes,
personal-level experiences (P), bodies (B), and their coupling with each
other and the (E) environment (Adapted from the work of Beer, 2000;
Bohl and van den Bos, 2012; Froese et al., 2013).
This is where we feel the methods of dynamical systems are useful
as an integrative means to provide for the examination of social
cognitive processes and refer the reader to Richardson et al. (2014)
for an overview of how dynamical methods could be applied to
map these relationships.
DISCUSSION
We have attempted to provide a framework for social cognition
and perception in this paper with an explicit focus on the social
information available in the environment. The next step is to map
out how this work can generate a research program. Wilson and
Golonka’s (2013) list of four questions to address for research
examining embodied cognition serves as guidance for such a pro-
gram. We briefly discuss these here. It is also important to point
out that aspects of our framework complement what others have
suggested with regard to additional social cognitive processes.
For example, radical embodiment and dynamic coupling have
been used to explain relational aspects of social cognition such
as Communal Sharing relations and Authority Ranking relations
(e.g., IJzerman and Koole, 2011; Beckes et al., 2014). However,
for the present purposes we focus on the utilization of social
information to understand and interact with others.
WHAT IS THE TASK TO BE SOLVED?
Wilson and Golonka (2013) argue for performing a task analysis
to better understand the nature of the behavior under investi-
gation. From this, researchers should attempt to categorize and
analyze social interactions by asking questions such as: What
types of social interactions are there? What are the goals of the
participants in such interactions? What kind of information is
needed to achieve these goals, and how is it to be used to those
ends? What is social cognition for in different types of interaction?
One example is bargaining. In the simplest case there are two
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participants: a buyer and a seller. The goal of the buyer is to
purchase a desired item at the lowest possible cost. The goal of
the seller is to maximize profit by selling the item for the highest
possible price. The act of bargaining is a social interaction that,
when successful, solves the problem of the differences in these
goals by settling on some value between the upper and lower
bounds of desired prices. The buyer has in mind a price she is
willing to pay, and the seller has in mind a price she is willing
to sell for, and each participant attempts to determine what those
values are in the mind of the other. Information about these values
may be revealed during the course of negotiations. In a broad
sense, across a variety of interactions, the task is to perceive the
mind and intentions of others, but also to determine what actions
and social goals others afford us.
WHAT RESOURCES ARE AVAILABLE TO A PARTICIPANT IN SOCIAL
INTERACTION FOR SOLVING THIS TASK?
At the basic level, as emphasized by Wilson and Golonka (2013),
these resources are a body, including a nervous system, and an
environment. The nervous system equips one with a percep-
tual apparatus. The body enables interaction. The environment
contains the structure necessary to specify social information.
Our integration of Gibsonian direct perception, the KSD prin-
ciple, social cues and signals, situational semantics, projectable
and non-projectable properties, and the Lens Model, provides
a framework for determining an index of direct social percep-
tion and guiding the study of dynamic coupling across levels of
social units. The broad goal is to show that the information to
support social interaction exists, in principle. Kinematic analy-
sis of the movements of others, Lens Model analysis (Cooksey,
1996; Hirschmüller et al., 2013) to examine the social cue and
signal relationships, and geometric analysis (e.g., Nakayama and
Loomis, 1974; Lee, 1976) of the information available to the per-
ceptual systems, are required to answer this question. Importantly,
one might consider how to determine whether a social cue, or
set of social cues, veridically specifies a social signal. We have
discussed in other work the degree to which techniques such as
self-report, wisdom of the crowd, and expert ratings could be
used to determine this (Wiltshire et al., 2014b). However, to some
degree this is not necessary, though it would be quite informative.
In other words, we do not assume that direct perception, or
social perception more generally, must be accurate. Therefore, the
approaches mentioned here for examining social cue and signal
relationships are relative to the perceiver and evidence of direct
perception of a social signal (perhaps, an inaccurate one) could
be identified regardless.
HOW ARE THESE RESOURCES ASSEMBLED TO SOLVE THE TASK?
Our approach suggests the possibility of a direct approach to
social perception where perceptions are coupled with actions.
Social interactions are perceptually guided, while at the same time
generating new perceptual information. Research in social neu-
roscience, such as the study of M-pathways or motor resonance
systems, alongside advances in the theory of intentional dynamics,
can support this line of research. Following from the first question
that there is a need to categorize social situations, there is a
further need to categorize specific actions and interactions within
these social situations. Defining the social action categories is
a necessary step toward understanding how such actions are
perceptually guided and organized, and further, how they become
structured by intentional dynamics and in turn provide social
information to the other. This aspect of a developing research
program is captured in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, above.
The potential for lawful mapping between social cues and social
signals may be dependent upon the situational characteristics of
a given interaction. That is, certain situations may produce a
lawful mapping between a set of social cues and a social signal,
which can be perceived and processed automatically, quickly,
and intuitively (see Wiltshire et al., 2014b for specific situational
characteristics hypothesized to elicit such perceptions). It is by
understanding not just the content of the social cues, but the
context of the situation, that would facilitate understanding how
social signals emerge from sets of social cues. Further, Propo-
sition 6 makes an explicit claim about the relationship of a
signal’s constituent social cues to one another. Together, these
propositions provide for explicit testable hypotheses—and in the
case of Proposition 6, is itself, a testable hypothesis—to examine
how our framework of social cognition works to answer this
question.
DURING SOCIAL INTERACTIONS, DO PEOPLE PERCEIVE AND USE THIS
INFORMATION TO GUIDE INTERACTION?
The answer to this question ultimately remains an empirical one
for future work to demonstrate. Wilson and Golonka (2013)
note that the typical procedure in perceptual research is the
perturbation experiment. Once the perceptual information and
relevant action have been identified, researchers should perturb
the available information and observe the systematic effect this
has on social interaction. In traditional perceptual research, per-
turbations are somewhat easy to achieve through the use of com-
puter displays. However, the study of social interaction provides
additional challenges. We have argued that the passive viewing
of others in photographs or videos provides only a limited way
to assess social perception, which is necessarily active and follows
from social situations in which the observer is a participant and
has goals to be achieved. Hence, there is a necessity of taking
a perception-action approach to social perception. The use of
virtual environments may provide a useful tool for engaging
participants in social interactions while enabling experimenters
to manipulate and perturb the available information. Our above
Propositions 3, 4, and 5 touch on various aspects of this ques-
tion. Propositions 3 and 4 make claims about the projectable
nature of social cues and some social signals, and the non-
projectable nature of other social signals. These propositions
help lay the foundation for testing the perceivable nature of
social cues and social signals. Proposition 5 takes an empirical
position on the role of the nervous system, in particular the dorsal
visual stream, in processing the action opportunities afforded by
the directly perceived projectable properties. Lastly, determining
whether someone perceived and actually uses social cues could
be assessed using the cue utilization coefficients, which can be
derived by having participants weight the cues after the fact or
other physiological measures such as eye-tracking (Wiltshire et al.,
2014b).
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In conclusion, though traditional approaches to social cog-
nition have produced intriguing explanations for how the brain
processes social information, embodied and enactive approaches
have shifted the consensus on the role of mental representations.
Accordingly, understanding social cognition necessitates under-
standing an organism as embodied, situated, and acting within a
data-rich social environment (e.g., Marsh et al., 2009a,b; Semin
and Smith, 2013). In this article, we have built upon a framework
meant to reconcile these approaches by relying on dual-process
theories of cognition. We argued that this account was limited
in its articulation of the prospects of direct social perception.
The research propositions included throughout should serve to
advance the science of social cognition through more systematic
and theory-driven empirical examination. In this, we offer a path
toward the reconciliation of radical and traditional approaches to
social cognition. Our hope is that this effort contributes signifi-
cantly towards understanding the complexity of what is perceived
as the most socially intelligent creature known to walk the earth.
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